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Mao Zedong and Mohandas Gandhi: Revolutionary 
Pragmatists? 
 




Abstract: Before 1949, both China and India experienced protracted 
struggles to gain freedom from their respective governing bodies. 
Although the Chinese and Indian Revolutions occurred during the same 
time period, and on the same continent, little energy has been spent on 
comparing the two in any appreciable manner, even less so when it 
comes to the leaders of the movements themselves. Granted, the 
reasoning for this is due to the belief that Mao Zedong and Mohandas 
Gandhi are too dissimilar for any fruitful analysis to be obtained by 
juxtaposing them, but this paper’s focus is on proving that they are far 
more alike than anyone has ever given them credit. Both men were 
pragmatic revolutionaries who adapted to the needs of their movements, 
and were willing to be flexible to new developments which could 
potentially alter fundamental underpinnings of their uprisings. With the 
preexisting notions of class struggle and violence which have so 
characterized Mao Zedong in the past, it may be absurd to claim him as 
a pragmatist, but in reality, he was in fact a powerful coalition builder 
before the People’s Republic of China was founded. Furthermore, 
Mohandas Gandhi is seen as the principal advocate of non-violence in 
recent memory, but he accepted violence to avoid cowardice, and only 
came to the stance of non-violence after observing firmer approaches 
earlier in his life. Even though the two men arrived at different 
conclusions of how to best achieve victory, they did so for the identical 
reason of it being in the best interests of the Indian and Chinese freedom 
organizations. Most importantly, both revolutionaries came to personify 
their movements, and that accounts for their “god-like” standing in 
historical texts. This paper is intended to bring Mao and Gandhi down 
from their mythologized status and to see them for who they were during 
their revolutions, ordinary human beings who were pragmatic enough to 
sustain the momentum of their individual movements. Without their 
realism, the Indian and Chinese Revolutions would have been radically 
different. 
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Adapting to current conditions is a necessary feature of any revolution, 
but this creates internal conflicts which are inherently different. Failing  
to adapt leads to rigidity, which in turn causes a near-certain failure to  
the insurrection and a possible collapse of the entire revolutionary 
movement. Strong leaders who are able to adapt to existing situations are 
vital to the success of any uprising, and both Mohandas Gandhi (1869- 
1948) and Mao Zedong (1893-1976) were consummate pragmatists in 
their respective countries. They are among the most important figures in 
Asia during this time period, and little has been done to compare their 
views. While both men had fundamentally different philosophies on how 
to bring about revolutionary change, which might make comparison  
seem fruitless, research has shown that they may be more similar than 
previously believed. Essentially, they chose those different ideals for 
identical reasons. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that without the flexibility 
and modifications of Mao Zedong and Gandhi to better conform to their 
environments, the Indian and Chinese Revolutions would have been 
radically different, because there was no other individual who could have 
taken their place and maintained the level of revolutionary fervor they 
engendered. As a result, the time period examined here will be almost 
exclusively pre-1949 due to: the Indian Revolution succeeding with the 
withdrawal of the British in 1947 and Gandhi being assassinated in 1948, 
and Mao Zedong overthrowing the Nationalist Party and proclaiming the 
People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. 
In addition, this endeavor is further aimed at discussing the 
similarities and differences between their theories and ideologies in order 
to arrive at a clearer understanding of why Mao and Gandhi, although 
contemporaries in Asia, chose radically differently philosophies but were 
nonetheless still able to succeed. The reason for their success stems from 
their ability to conform to the needs of the time. It is entirely likely that 
they were only ones capable of accomplishing this vital task. 
A great deal of Gandhi’s beliefs and convictions stemmed from 
his studies in England and from his involvement as a member of the 
ambulance corps during various wars in South Africa. During return trips 
to India, he became increasingly embroiled in the struggle of his people 
against British rule, which led him on the path to becoming a 
revolutionary. While he was the embodiment of the term  
“revolutionary,” he was far more like a social reformer and diplomat 
which caused him to become the leader of a revolutionary movement. 
Gandhi did not seek the leadership of the Indian organization, but 
accepted it because he possessed the charisma to deal with the British on 
their terms in order to obtain a favorable conclusion to their existing 
strife. Unlike him in a vast variety of ways, Mao Zedong remained 
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radical throughout his entire life. His beliefs in “permanent revolution” 
and violent upheaval led to constant political problems and bordered on 
anarchism at times. Mao had never studied outside of China and only 
went as far as Beijing University, the place where his actual Communist 
ideals took root under the tutelage of the Chinese innovator of Marxism 
and Beijing University librarian, Li Dazhao (1888-1927). 
Mohandas Gandhi and Mao Zedong personified their  
revolutions. Even though there were other skilled leaders present, such as 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai (who were more behind-the-scenes 
contributors to their movements), they were the only likely candidates 
able to lead their revolutions effectively. The reasoning for this assertion 
is the result of their ability to adjust their ideologies to best represent  
their respective peoples. In essence, Mao and Gandhi created a 
dependency on their presence, because of the pragmatism they espoused. 
The sheer amount of similarities revealed here between one of the most 
violent revolutionaries in history, and the greatest advocate of non- 
violence in the twentieth century, is remarkable. 
 
 
The Path to Pragmatism 
 
At their core, both revolutionaries fought for, and even against, similar 
concepts and figures. Gandhi was a man of compromise and 
understanding, while Mao was radical and violent for the most part. The 
former was a student of the British who found that the best way to get 
them to leave his country was working with them (In a diplomatic sense, 
i.e. through compromise and understanding. This is true even with the 
reality that the movement as a whole obviously worked against British 
interests through non-cooperation with laws they disagreed with.) toward 
that goal based on his extensive experience with the police in South 
Africa1 instead of using force as the latter believed was necessary.2 Much 
of this stemmed from Gandhi’s spirituality, which drove him to live his 
life in a way which would not bring shame to him or anyone else; he 
chose to live by the principle of “Hate the sin, not the sinner,”3 and 
believed that “To slight a single human being is to slight those divine 
powers, and thus to harm not only that being but with him the whole 
world.”4 Nevertheless, Gandhi still retained the seemingly contradictory 
feeling that “where there is only a choice between cowardice and 
 
 
1 Mohandas Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with 
Truth (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 275-76. 
2 Mao Tse-Tung, On Revolution and War, ed. M. Rejai (Garden City New York: 
Doubleday and Company Inc., 1969), 57. 
3 Gandhi, 276. 
4 Ibid. 
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violence, I would advise violence.”5 In his country, Mao felt that 
“Without armed struggle the proletariat and the Communist Party would 
have no standing at all in China, and it would be impossible to 
accomplish any revolutionary task.”6 The point is, however, that both 
men were the products of whatever circumstances they found themselves 
in (as will be discussed next) and had learned to adapt to what they 
believed was necessary to further their personal and public goals. 
From his youth, Gandhi had made the conscious decision to 
become a vegetarian and follow the instructions of his mother  
vehemently while studying law in London7 and while in South Africa 
where he participated in the Boer War and the Zulu Rebellion as an 
ambulance attendant.8 This, for lack of a better phrase, strict adherence to 
instructions and a policy of not hurting animals by refusing meat, laid a 
firm foundation for his later beliefs in non-violence and peaceful non- 
cooperation. Regardless, Gandhi was not a revolutionary in the common 
understanding of the word (i.e. “rebel,” “insurrectionist,” or “renegade”), 
for a number of reasons. For instance, he believed that even if his people 
had the weapons to seize the country by force, they most likely would  
not have chosen to do so because it was not in the nature of the majority 
of the Indian people.9 While he may have led a movement against them 
and was anti-imperialistic, Gandhi never saw the British people 
themselves in a negative light, something which he believed had been 
misunderstood by the government in London. “India has no quarrel with 
the British people. I have hundreds of British friends. Andrews’ 
friendship was enough to tie me to the British people. But both he and I 
were fixed in our determination that British rule in India, in any shape or 
form, must end.”10 In fact, due to those cordial relations, many 
Englishmen in India began seeing the British presence there in the same 
way that Gandhi and his movement did; it was not a benevolent force,  
but a burdensome overseer.11 This growing sentiment, along with his  






5 Mark Juergensmeyer, Gandhi’s Way A Handbook of Conflict Resolution 
(USA: University of California Press, 2002), ix. 
6 Mao, 57. 
7 Gandhi, 38-39. 
8 Samuel Farber, “Violence and Material Class Interests: Fanon and Gandhi,” 
Journal of Asian and African Studies 16, no. 3/4 (1981): 202. 
9 Robert Blackey and Clifford Paynton, Revolution and the Revolutionary Ideal 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1976) p. 147. 
10 Mohandas Gandhi, My Appeal to the British, ed. Anand T. Hingorani (New 
York: John Day Company, 1942), 19. 
11 Ibid., 18-19, 24, 37. 
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Africa, made him come to see them as capable of both reason and 
cooperation.12 
Mao never had such amicable relations with an imperial power, 
or even his family for that matter. Much like Gandhi, Mao’s mother 
meant a great deal to him (some scholars, such as Lowell Dittmer, have 
claimed he had an Oedipus complex),13 but his father was a deep-rooted 
source for his inclination toward conflict.14 Growing up in a small village 
in a rural area of Hunan Province in southern China, Mao’s many 
neighbors still lived under the same backward technological, social, and 
economic conditions that existed in the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), and 
his father came to symbolize that old way of life to Mao, politically and 
socially. 
 
My mother was a kind woman, generous and 
sympathetic, and ever ready to share what she had. She 
pitied the poor and often gave them rice when they came 
to ask for it during famines. But she could not do so 
when my father was present. He disapproved of charity. 
We had many quarrels in my home over this question. 
There were two “parties” in the family. One was my 
father, the Ruling Power. The Opposition was made up 
of myself, my mother, my brother, and sometimes even 
the laborer. In the “united front” of the Opposition, 
however, there was a difference of opinion. My mother 
advocated a policy of indirect attack. She criticized any 
overt display of emotion and attempts at open rebellion 
against the Ruling Power. She said it was not the 
Chinese way. 15 
 
Mao became frustrated with the selfish rigidity of his father’s feeling that 
his son should serve the family in accordance with Confucian values. 
With this inflexible attitude, and the rebellious tendencies of a youth, 
Mao acted out against his father on numerous occasions,16 a tendency  
that never subsided. It follows that when faced with a similar wall later in 
his life, that of the state of his country and people, he would again defy 
authority; in his case, this included several imperialistic countries and 
eventually the Nationalist Party under Chiang Kai-shek as well. This was 
 
12 Kamlesh Mohan, “An Assessment of the Gandhian Attitude towards Militant 
Nationalists in the 1920’s,” The Quarterly Review of Historical Studies 18, no. 2 
(1978): 103. 
13 Lowell Dittmer, “Mao and the Politics of Revolutionary Morality,” Asian 
Survey 3, no. 27 (1987): 317. 
14 Ibid., 317-18. 
15 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1968): 132. 
16 Dittmer, 318. 
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a task that Mao described as: “the overthrow of three mountains- 
feudalism, imperialism, and the comprador bourgeoisie" (the latter being 
the indirect imperialism through Chiang Kai-shek).17 Multiple foes, with 
multiple agendas, helped pave the way for Mao to accept violent 
revolution as the only possible solution to the existing state of China. 
Both men were ideally suited to lead given the context of their 
regions, but it was still necessary for them to adapt their ideologies to the 
circumstances of the people themselves by being pragmatic about their 
situation, in order to win them over. As with any revolution, there are 
always numerous ideas, figures, and avenues people wish to support in 
order to succeed in achieving political power. It is essential that either a 
single person, or idea, predominates over others, or that all of the 
different plans to bring about change are reconciled with one another at 
some point. Gandhi and Mao were able to do this and consequently 
became the unquestioned leaders of their revolutionary movements by 
committing a great deal of time and effort toward that goal. 
Of the two men, Mao, had the hardest time achieving party 
dominance, but Gandhi did have some difficultly as well. The Chinese 
Revolution had a great many people who could possibly lead it, and 
many did at varying times. This caused disunity and fragmentation  
within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), characteristics which 
Communism and Leninism were not supposed to have. The largest  
hurdle that Mao had to contend with, and the one which brought him to 
dominance once he overcame it, was defeating Wang Ming, Li Lisan, the 
“28 Bolsheviks,” and the Comintern representatives (most notably Otto 
Braun) who wanted to “Bolshevize” the party and get them away from 
relying on the peasants instead of adapting to what the movement 
actually needed.18 These men had been trained in Moscow by the Soviet 
Union and felt they knew what was best for the party to succeed against 
the Nationalists. However, their short stints as leaders of the party ended 
after their policies failed to protect the Jiangxi Soviet from Chiang Kai- 
shek’s extermination campaigns, because they insisted on utilizing 
conventional warfare against Nationalist armies. Mao had always 
advocated for guerilla tactics to be used in pairing with other forms of 
warfare, and this had mainly worked in holding off numerous attacks on 
their base areas, both before and after he rose to power.19 As Mao told 
Edgar Snow: “This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic 
points, which can be defended in positional warfare as long as profitable. 
 
 
17 Tan Chung, “Chinese History and the Chinese Revolution: On the Dynamism 
of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought,” China Report 26, no. 1 (1990): 7. 
18 Nick Knight, “Working Class Power and State Formation in Mao Zedong’s 
Thought 1931-1934,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 32, no. 1 (2002): 33.     
19 Mao Tse-Tung, On the Protracted War (Peking: People’s Publishing 
House/Foreign Language Press, 1960): 104. 
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But the pivotal strategy must be a war of maneuver, and important 
reliance must be placed on guerilla and partisan tactics. Fortified warfare 
must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and secondary importance.”20 
Otto Braun and Wang Ming, however, managed to convince the party 
that they instead had to adopt the same conventional military blockhouse 
tactics being employed by Chiang Kai-shek in order to gain decisive 
victories over him. They wanted to exclusively use conventional warfare, 
instead of it being used in the background as Mao had planned. 
Following this policy led to the famous “Long March” and the Zunyi 
Conference of 1935 where Mao rose to unquestioned party dominance 
due to his successful tactics, charisma, and advocacy that the peasants 
had to be the main revolutionary apparatus rather than the small and 
weak urban proletariat.21 
 
Thus, his admiration for the revolutionary potential of  
the peasants was balanced by a realistic assessment of 
their shortcomings as a class, and their urgent need for 
leadership by the working class and its vanguard party. 
His words then were certainly not those of a 
revolutionary who willingly embraced rural revolution 
and uncritically revered the revolutionary potential of the 
peasantry. They were, rather, the words of one who finds 
himself forcibly separated from the cities and the 
working class, and compelled to find a strategy which 
could exploit the dissatisfaction of the peasantry and 
channel their revolutionary impulse in the direction of a 
modernising revolution. Mao did not, therefore, lose 
sight of the need for working class leadership of the 
Chinese revolution, and his words and policies of the 
Jiangxi Soviet are consistent with those of both the 1927-
30 and post-1949 periods.22 
 
This pragmatism was vital to installing Mao in the position of party 
leader following the failures of his peers. Even as early as 1936, under  
his leadership, “the Communists (and the Comintern) had radically 
changed their position. In a search for broad national unity, they included 
the Kuomintang and even Chiang Kai-shek…provided that the latter 
would agree to ‘establish democratic representative government, resist 




20 Snow, 112. 
21 Mao, On Revolution and War, 10-11. 
22 Knight, “Working Class Power and State Formation in Mao Zedong’s 
Thought 1931-1934,” 33-34. 
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masses.’”23 Claiming Mao was a pragmatist, “whose genius consisted not 
only in a brilliant clarity of mind but in an almost uncanny understanding 
of Chinese peasant problems,”24 and who carefully and thoughtfully 
altered his beliefs to the circumstances of his movement, may sound 
inherently absurd with the ideas of violence and class struggle which has 
so characterized people’s memories of him in the past; but during critical 
times of conflict in the pre-1949 era, he continually distinguished himself 
as a pragmatist and coalition builder. 
In India, there were fewer people who could have taken the reins 
of leadership than there were in China, mainly due to the country having 
been a fully absorbed crown colony of the British for so long, unlike 
China which had endured centuries of dynastic and quasi- 
imperial/colony status by several different nations. One of the only 
noteworthy examples of who could have led were the Militant 
Nationalists,25 and with the nervousness of the Indian people in this time 
period toward open conflict (a nature which Gandhi shared, even 
admitting that he himself was a rather shy person for most of his life, 
something which he “never completely overcame”),26 few could resist in 
an overtly militaristic way as they advocated. Gandhi may not have been 
a particularly charismatic man, but he did know how to speak with 
ordinary people and make them understand that they had to work  
together in order to defy British rule. Unity was absolutely necessary due 
to how fragmented the country was along religious and caste lines, and 
because “he was also convinced that the people’s united struggle alone 
could overthrow colonialism.”27 In his eyes, only a concerted effort that 
had the backing of the entire country could force the British to accept the 
desire of the Indian people to rule themselves, and this would encourage 
them to withdraw willingly, and peacefully.28 
Both men were able to dominate the leadership of their 
respective movements by unseating the opposition with the pragmatic 
promotion of their ideals. While other people may have led the Chinese 
and Indian Revolutions at one point or another, only Mao and Gandhi 
personified those revolutions by eventually emerging as the ones who 
could meet the needs of the people and take advantage of the climate of 
the time. As a result, they succeeded not only in bringing the desired 
revolutionary change, but also being the only ones who adjusted to the 
 
23 Snow, 102. 
24 Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder out of China, (USA: Da 
Capo Press, Inc., 1980): 238. 
25 Mohan, “An Assessment of the Gandhian Attitude towards Militant 
Nationalists in the 1920’s,” 103-104. 
26 Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth, 59-61. 
27 Mohan, “An Assessment of the Gandhian Attitude towards Militant 
Nationalists in the 1920’s,” 105. 
28 Ibid. 
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Although both men had different ways of accomplishing the changes  
they desired, they had similar views on the need to utilize all levels of 
society to succeed in gaining autonomy from foreigners. This view can  
be seen in Mao and Gandhi’s use of the peasantry and the masses, one of 
the few, but important, similarities that can be found between them. 
China and India in general were similar in that they were subordinated to 
imperial powers: India directly as a British crown colony, China 
indirectly through the rule of the Guomindang/Kuomintang and through 
the system of treaty ports/concessions with foreign nations throughout  
the twentieth century. Both countries had been violently suppressed by 
force of arms in the past, and this created a seething desire to rid 
themselves of colonizers. In India, on April 13, 1919, General Dyer 
ordered “the firing of 1,650 rounds of ammunition without warning at a 
peaceful crowd, [and] regarded it as an opportunity to show people the 
might of the British Empire for he imagined that ‘the Lord hath delivered 
them into my hands.’”29 This event, which became known as the 
Jallianwala Bagh Massacre (or more commonly, the Amritsar Massacre) 
left 379 dead, and possibly 1,200 wounded.30 The killing did not end on 
that day, and continued for several more throughout the area. 
“Henceforth, political awakening and disillusionment with British rulers 
grew at a rapid pace.”31 Similarly, on May 30, 1925, demonstrators (who 
were demanding the release of a number of imprisoned students that had 
been arrested for protesting against work closures at a Shanghai textile 
mill) were fired upon by a British inspector; “eleven were killed and at 
least twenty wounded.”32 A month later, another 52 were killed and over 
100 more were wounded protesting these original deaths. “The 
humiliation of having foreign troops on Chinese soil who could kill with 
impunity led to an unprecedented anti-imperialist explosion that 
considerably increased the visibility of the CCP and the Guomindang.”33 
The May 30th Movement (as it became known as) and the Jallianwala 
Bagh Massacre fostered an intense anti-imperialism and caused a surge 
 
29 Mohan Kamlesh, “The Jallianwalla Bagh Tragedy and its Impact as a Catalyst 
of Indian National Consciousness,” International Journal of Punjab Studies 3, 
no. 2 (1996): 164. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 168. 
32 R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern 
Chinese History (U.S.A. Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2010): 191. 
33 Ibid. 
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of nationalism and revolutionary fervor among the Chinese and Indian 
people. These events (and the outrage caused by them) laid crucial 
groundwork which Gandhi and Mao expanded on and would utilize to 
further stimulate their movements. Both men were anti-imperialistic, and 
even though they saw different ways of dealing with it, they chose to 
adapt to these existing circumstances within their organizations. By 
doing so, they were able to make use of not only the peasantry, but also 
the nation as a whole. To put it succinctly, living under the occupation of 
foreign troops was rapidly becoming intolerable for everyone involved. 
On the topic of peasantry and class roles, one must begin with 
Mao Zedong because the topic is invariably linked to him. That said, 
however, the common belief that he exclusively relied on the peasantry 
and was not a Marxist-Leninist at all (instead only forming a Maoism) is 
unfounded.34 The reason for this lies in the overall point that he had to 
adapt to China’s existing state of affairs and be a more “pragmatic 
Marxist.”35 As Mao put it many times, building on the words of the 
deceased first leader of the Nationalist Party, Sun Yat-sen, China had a 
“semi-feudal and semi-colonial status”36 in the world, and the vast 
majority of the population were farmers and peasants. As a result, the 
proletariat/urban working class was simply too small to be an effective 
revolutionary force on their own,37 something that traditional Marxists 
believed was required to succeed in an uprising. Even though it can be 
questioned if Mao actually possessed an “admiration for the innate 
‘wisdom’ of the peasantry” and acknowledged an “ardent faith in the 
revolutionary creativity of the rural masses,”38 he came to rely on them 
regardless, whether he was mystified by them or not. Due to this, “Mao 
supposedly revealed a singular and conscious disregard for the 
theoretical strictures of Marxism,”39 and consequently, it is more 
appropriate to call Mao a Leninist rather than an outright Marxist or 
Maoist. This is because Lenin advocated a more pragmatic view that 
utilized everyone in Russia and turned the focus away from the 
proletariat as the sole group for revolutionary action during a time when 





34 Nick Knight “Mao Zedong and the Peasants: Class Power in the Formation of 
a Revolutionary Strategy,” China Report 40, no. 49 (2004): 50-51. 
35 Ibid., 50. 
36 Mao, On Revolution and War, 74-75. 
37 Ibid., 8. 
38 Knight, “Mao Zedong and the Peasants: Class Power in the Formation of a 
Revolutionary Strategy,” 50. 
39 Ibid., 51. 
40 Arif Dirlik, “The Predicament of Marxist Revolutionary Consciousness: Mao 
Zedong (Mao TseTung), Antonio Gramsci, and the Reformulation of Marxist 
Revolutionary Theory,” Modern China 9, no. 2 (1983): 192. 
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Knowing that China was so dependent on the peasantry and that 
its industrial class would not support a revolution, Mao advocated the use 
of the peasantry as the primary force for their insurrection. While he did 
have a great deal of support from other members of the CCP on this, he 
was continually opposed by many people (mentioned earlier) who 
adhered to a more “orthodox” version of Marxism that called for a 
proletarian revolution alone and who did their best to steer Mao away 
from his reliance on the peasantry. Regardless of this opposition, Mao 
was able to win over leadership of the party for a number of reasons, but 
the most relevant here was his confidence in the peasantry, and his 
compromise in which he still called for a revolution that was proletarian 
led, even if the membership was not proletarian dominated. One 
noteworthy example was the way he organized the CCP with  
“democratic centralism” and the “mass line” in which everyone’s ideas 
would ultimately be filtered and controlled by only a small number of 
people.41 This compromise, which was one of many before he became 
more authoritarian in 1942 during the Rectification Campaign (this will 
be discussed further in the following section), led to his becoming the 
unquestioned leader of the party and his eliminating of anyone else who 
could have led during this time period; this essentially created a 
dependency on Mao’s guidance in order to maintain the same 
revolutionary fervor that had begun to wane at the outset of the Long 
March. 
Returning more to the peasantry and masses specifically, though, 
“Mao developed a model for revolution that was successful in 
encouraging mass peasant support while making clear the revolution 
would not be led by the peasantry.”42 Simply, he could only see them as 
conservative and difficult to work with,43 but also necessary to win the 
revolution.44 Ultimately, even though he wanted to make use of everyone 
and had advocated a peasant-centric CCP since nearly the beginnings of 
the party, and especially after the White Terror and subsequent collapse 
of the First United Front in 1927, Mao remained in the position of having 
a proletarian-led revolution.45 Much like a true Marxist, he still viewed 
the proletariat as a better choice for revolutionary leadership, because: 
 
The Chinese proletariat is more resolute and 
thoroughgoing in revolutionary struggle than any other 
class because it is subjugated to a threefold oppression 
 
 
41 Ibid., 198. 
42 Knight, “Working Class Power and State Formation in Mao Zedong’s 
Thought 1931-1934,” 43. 
43 Ibid., 30. 
44 Ibid., 43. 
45 Ibid., 42-43. 
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(imperialist, bourgeois, and feudal) which is marked by a 
severity and cruelty seldom found in other  
countries…the Chinese proletariat came under the 
leadership of its own revolutionary party-the Communist 
Party of China-and became the most politically  
conscious class in Chinese society...the Chinese 
proletariat by origin is largely made up of bankrupted 
peasants, it has natural ties with the peasant masses, 
which facilitated its forming a close alliance with them.46 
 
While the merits of this philosophy can be debated, the innate 
conservativeness of the countryside is an accurate supposition, due in  
part to Chiang Kai-shek only extending his direct rule over the cities and 
the areas directly surrounding them. Mao picked up on this point early on 
and knew that the countryside was where the revolution would ultimately 
begin because it could, and would, be used as a base area to organize the 
majority of the population into a force to bring communism to the 
nation.47 In essence, even though Mao was pragmatic enough to realize 
that he needed to rely on the peasantry and the masses to effect 
revolutionary change, the title “peasant revolutionary” may not be an 
accurate one to assign to him due to his continual support for a  
proletarian leadership over them. Ultimately though, the Chinese 
Revolution still took on an aura of Mao-centrism, later termed “Mao 
Zedong thought” or “Maoism” in Yan’an,48 proving that without Mao,  
the CCP likely would not have had the same identity because it had 
become dependent on him as their leader. 
Even though Mao Zedong chose to live among the peasants 
during the revolution, he never truly meshed with them and lived as they 
did, which resulted in difficulties in getting them to agree with his 
notions of land reform and personal revolutionary ideals. This is a topic 
that will be discussed further in the next section. Gandhi, however, 
decided upon a Spartan lifestyle and full integration with the peasants.49 
“Gandhi had an uncanny, mysterious gift which kept him at all times in 
tune with the prevalent feelings and emotions of India's inarticulate 
peasants.”50 What made this even more unifying for the Indians was that 
Gandhi was from a relatively well-off family and had a decent law career 
that he chose to give up in favor of living among the poorer 
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groups/castes,51 all in order to get the general populace involved and to 
lift them out of their circumstances. Most importantly, Gandhi held a 
similar view of both the peasantry and working class that Mao had in 
China. 
Comparable to the makeup of the Chinese, the Indian peasantry 
made up a majority of the population, and even though the working class 
was not as tiny as it was in China, it was still rather small to say the least. 
Gandhi advocated that the peasantry should be fully involved in the 
political and revolutionary processes and in democracy as a whole, but 
must be led by the intellectuals/working class of the country.52 While 
Mao would not have openly approved of the leadership of intellectuals as 
a class, as was shown when he ordered the execution of liberal 
intellectual Wang Shiwei in 1947 during the evacuation of Yan’an,53 he 
wholly agreed with the domination by the proletariat and urban working 
class over the peasantry, and for the same reasons that Gandhi espoused. 
Although Bolshevik ideas spread throughout India after Lenin’s death in 
1924, there is no evidence that Gandhi himself was affected by Marxism 
or Leninism beyond his saying: 
 
India does not want Bolshevism. The people are too 
peaceful to stand anarchy. They will bow to the knee 
who restores so called order. Let us recognise the Indian 
psychology….The average Mussalman of India is quite 
different than the average Mussalman of the other part of 
the world. The Hindu is proverbially, almost completely 
mild. The Parsi and the Christian love peace more than 
strike. Indeed, we have almost made religion subservient 
to peace.54 
 
After stating this clear understanding of the Indian people and being 
pragmatic enough to mold himself into the preexisting feelings in order 
to achieve success in their movement, Gandhi refused to accept 
invitations to visit the Soviet Union in the 1920s,55 but the similarity of 
his ideals to the underlying concepts of Marxist thought, especially 
proletarian dominance over the peasantry, is striking. 
In addition, both Gandhi and Mao were anti-imperialists, as 
mentioned above, but even though Mao entirely despised imperialism, 
Gandhi hated it because he felt that the practice had been perpetuated to 
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divide and destroy the consciousness of the Indian people.56 As a result, 
Gandhi chose to eat frugally and shed a safe home and career in order to 
live in the simple dress (he only owned one shirt) and poor sanitary 
conditions that the peasants were forced to toil under. He further gained 
the admiration of the peasants by trying to restore Indian self-respect57 
and by utilizing symbols that would get everyone involved in one way or 
another. The Spinning Wheel, which is now on the flag of India, was 
used to gain the support of women and promote equality for them,58 
(Gandhi understood that “no mass movement could be successful  
without the ‘muted’ sections of society” and heavily encouraged female 
involvement because they fell into that category.)59 something Mao was 
attempting to accomplish as well. This was also aimed at stimulating a 
national interest, and nationalism specifically, in Indian cloth over that 
which came from England. Their fabric could easily be created by Indian 
women on their own spinning wheels with the huge quantities of 
domestic cotton, the main reason for Gandhi seeing the imports as  
asinine and unnecessary.60 Not doing so, “was to Gandhi's mind a waste 
of both substance and opportunities of poor people in a country where 
cotton abounded;”61 as a result, he believed that “the dumping down of 
foreign cloth in India has reduced millions of my people to pauperism.”62 
The term used by Gandhi to describe this was Swadeshi, which roughly 
refers to an emphasis on domestic production and consumption, as well 
as the rejection of foreign-made goods.63 Furthermore, the famous 
violation of the Salt Tax by Gandhi, which everyone suffered from 
because salt was one of the few seasonings that Indians could afford and 
produce on their own, achieved a mass following that succeeded in 
garnering the support of most of the masses.64 Again, most importantly, 
the disobedience in choosing to create their own salt despite the ban 
encouraged crucial female involvement. These symbols were coined, and 
these actions executed, to show the British that they were more than 
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Gandhi was completely committed to promoting equality and 
democracy in India in order to continue keeping mass involvement in the 
important events of the country and to facilitate better communication 
among the people. As mentioned earlier, Gandhi utilized symbols to not 
only engage women in the struggle, but to make them feel included and 
consulted in the revolutionary process; and not “ignorant of the prevalent 
political situation”65 currently underway. Also, he envisioned a society 
that was not necessarily a utopia of collaboration, but one based on the 
need for teamwork; not on a government that told everyone what to do. 
This led Gandhi to accept a de-centralized democracy because he felt  
that industry must work cooperatively with farmers and that society must 
not treat any individual as untouchable,66 two things that having a 
centralized democracy like Mao had in China did not do. In essence, he 
believed that “individuals and groups must function non-violently 
through mutual aid and cooperation”67 to bring about a lasting peace, not 
violence and rigid conformity to party doctrine. 
This is why much of Gandhi’s ideologies were based on some 
level of understanding, compromise, and cooperation. As a result, he felt 
it was possible to persuade the British to leave voluntarily through 
diplomacy and that it was possible to include everyone in the struggle for 
freedom, not just a single class that would simply take over and continue 
oppressive policies. Most importantly, he also promoted collaboration 
between the Muslims and Hindus, because despite their differences, 
Gandhi knew that in order for a revolution to succeed there had to be an 
“Indian United Front” of not only the different social classes but also of 
the different religions and economic backgrounds.68 As he argued: 
"Muslim-Hindu unity must be our creed to last for all time and under all 
circumstances."69 With this mass movement, non-violence and peaceful 
non-cooperation could be successful; without it, the British would 
continue to be able to divide and control the Indian people. In many 
ways, Mao and the CCP felt the same way about the necessity of a mass 
movement, and this is why they promoted such a diverse coalition  
against not only the Japanese and other imperialists, but also the 
Nationalist Party during the civil war and World War II. 
To both figures, a revolution had to be a popular movement of 
the peasantry, led by the proletariat (and also the intellectuals in 
Gandhi’s case), that would affect revolutionary change. Without the 
unity among the classes and the masses, the revolutionary movement 
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would be less likely to succeed. While class roles were far more strictly 
enforced in the Chinese Revolution, the Indians did utilize a loose class 
structure because “as it is, the rich are discontented no less than the 
poor,” and this alliance was aimed at promoting equality and cooperation 
to succeed in the struggle against an occupying force.70 Both of these  
men were powerful and innovative coalition builders who were able to 
unite their fragmented organizations, despite preexisting notions of who 
Mao was during the time period in question. Essentially, the ideals of 
Gandhi and Mao embodied their respective revolutions and were 
especially applicable above all other alternatives, and this made them 
indispensable to their countries, their peoples, their revolutionary 






This paper will now compare the most divisive characteristic which 
delineates Gandhi and Mao, that of advocacy for non-violence and 
violence, respectively. While this has been briefly touched upon already, 
it will be covered more in-depth here. It is important to note that this 
discussion will not be aimed at debating the merits of either ideology, but 
will show that even though violence and non-violence are obviously 
antithetical, both figures arrived at their philosophies for the same  
reason: that their chosen approach was best for their movements, even 
though the same reasons led to diverging conclusions. As a result, they 
were willing to do whatever was necessary to win power for their 
organizations, and did so in order to maneuver into the position of using 
any desirable instrument to their advantage. Seeing the two men in this 
manner pulls them down from the mythical status assigned to them and 
shows who they truly were, pragmatic men who used ideologies which 
would foster both unity and support within the confines of their fragile 
alliances. 
Many people, including a number of Maoists, have viewed 
Gandhi’s use of non-violence as a sign of weakness which led to India 
remaining in a state of perpetual colonialism modeled on the former 
British administration,71 a perspective that is simply not true. “In general, 
violent overthrow of the government has been the popular method 
adopted by revolutionaries irrespective of their creed, nationality, or 
race,”72 but there is no prerequisite that all must be; Gandhi has been the 
notable exception to that rule. No two revolutions are the same, because 
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even if one replicated the same circumstances, there would probably be 
different results due to the unpredictability of human nature. Gandhi saw 
the need for a “constructive revolution” which would build a new state, 
not a destructive one that would delay progress.73 “The constructive 
program was an essential component of Gandhian revolutionary struggle 
for Indian independence. It was the constructive program which gave 
content to the satyagraha framework and applied the Gandhian  
principles to the Indian circumstances.”74 Being constructive, rather than 
destructive, was a vital piece of the Indian struggle for freedom, and 
Gandhi was pragmatic enough to realize this; non-violence was  
necessary not only because of the nervous nature of those in their 
movement, but also because they did not want to destroy their own 
society in the process of gaining independence. Whereas on a base level, 
all revolutionary leaders would probably agree with this, most would see 
the constructive aspect of the revolution being the result of the  
destructive one because it is necessary to destroy in order to create; Mao 
would of course agree with this stance. Gandhi, however, felt that the use 
of colonial violence against colonizers, in order to free themselves from 
the colonizer (the exact idea the Militant Nationalists were advocating), 
was an oxymoron and that it would undermine the goals of the Indian 
people.75 “Secrecy and terrorism led to demoralisation and wastage,  
while Gandhi sought to bring revolution by converting the adversary to 
his point of view and enlisting him in the brotherhood of man.”76 This is 
why Gandhi cultivated so many relationships with British people living  
in South Africa and India, because he did not want to lead an 
underground movement, but one that had a moral creed and did things in 
the light of day; not in dark alleyways. He essentially believed (and so  
did the Indian people of course) that clandestine/armed operations to gain 
their freedom would fail, and consequently make it even more difficult to 
achieve independence due to the duplication of the death and violence 
used by imperialists and colonists. 
As a result, it is more appropriate to look upon Gandhi as a 
diplomat and social reformer, rather than an outright revolutionary; at 
least when one is employing the modern sense of the word. A pivotal 
aspect of the revolution for him was to bring the colonizer over to his 
way of thinking peacefully, not through direct conflict, and he worked 
with the British tirelessly to achieve this goal. In addition, he not only 
forced himself, but also convinced all of his followers through careful 
deliberation, to practice self-restraint and control when dealing with the 
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English throughout their everyday lives and during the revolution.77 Due 
to this, the word diplomat can be assigned to Gandhi because he wanted 
to work within the bounds of the established system in order to be able to 
defy and defeat that system. 
To Gandhi, non-violence meant “infinite love.”78 The most 
accurate way to explain this would be to loosely think of the old Hippy 
adage: “Make love, not war.” Gandhi was nowhere near the type of 
enemy to the British that Mao was to the Nationalists, and knew that he 
could work with them toward an amicable solution that would benefit 
both their peoples. He felt, and promoted, the feeling that the British 
should not be ashamed to bow out of India, even if it was during the 
Second World War. As Gandhi said in June, 1942: 
 
If British Power is withdrawn from India in an orderly 
manner, Britain will be relieved of the burden of keeping 
peace in India, and at the same time gain in a free India 
an ally not in the cause of Empire-because she would 
have renounced in toto all her imperial designs-but in 
defense, not pretended but wholly real, of human 
freedom.79 
 
This was because even though India would remain neutral, the Allies 
would still be allowed to use Indian rail and supply lines to benefit their 
war efforts.80 Added to this, even if the Japanese were able to succeed in 
their invasion of Indian Territory, they would be non-violently resisted in 
the same manner that the British currently were, and this would be 
equally effective against them as it had been against the English.81 
With regards to the Japanese and allowing India to be a quasi- 
supporter of the British and their allies during the war if they pulled out, 
Gandhi actually took the time to acknowledge others’ contributions 
against their mutual enemies. Even though he may not have agreed with 
either’s ideals, he said the cost that the Russians and Chinese had paid to 
fight the Axis powers had been enormous, and he sympathized with their 
plight.82 Gandhi disapproved of Japanese aggression as much as anyone 
in China, but said that “China never tried any experiment with non- 
violence. That the Chinese remained passive for some time is no proof 
that it was a non-violent attitude."83 Consequently, their violence against 
the Japanese (and others) only caused more pain and suffering, and led to 
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further suppression during their occupation. While many in India had 
grown impatient with the non-violence that Gandhi advocated and  
desired quicker results (something similar to the assertiveness of Mao in 
China),84 most still agreed that violence, especially when the British were 
in a state of war, would get them nowhere and that self-restraint was a 
watchword for their success. 
This paper has been intentionally general with the exact 
terminology that Gandhi employed to describe his ideals because a 
thorough discussion of the application of the concepts and ideals 
themselves, not the names, would lead to a better understanding of his 
beliefs; but some are nevertheless unavoidable, namely, Satyagraha and 
ahimsa. For all intents and purposes, these were the words that Gandhi 
used in all aspects of his revolution, and the former basically meant a 
general focus on the pursuit of truth and firmness while the latter can be 
interpreted to mean non-violence.85 All of his followers were required to 
take vows of (translated to their English equivalents): truth, non- 
violence, chastity, non-possession, fearlessness, palate control, non- 
stealing, bread-labor, equality of religions, anti-untouchability, and use  
of locally made goods.86 To Gandhi, all of these related to truth and were 
aimed at making people understand that “man is not capable of knowing 
the absolute truth and, therefore not competent to punish;”87 hence, non- 
violence and non-cooperation/civil disobedience with laws they found 
corrupt and immoral were what was necessary to win the revolution. 
Most of this was linked to how Gandhi promoted an all- 
encompassing use of religion as well. Although it is important to reiterate 
that he encouraged cooperation between both Muslims and Hindus 
(another uncommon belief that Gandhi promoted in the pursuit of unity 
for his movement), it is crucial to note that he said that every Satyagrahi 
(i.e., a person who practices Satyagraha) must have an unshakeable faith 
in God.88 This is because he saw that life persists in the midst of 
destruction and violence, and that there must be a higher power and law 
than any that humanity could impose.89 All of his ideals and thoughts 
were aimed at creating a spirit among the Indian people that would wish 
to gain their freedom with minimal bloodshed and in a manner which  
was applicable to the mood of the time. India had always been a rather 
religious society, but never had a violent revolutionary culture. Gandhi 
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enough as to apply his philosophy in a way that would engender mass 
popular support. 
In contrast, the Chinese people had not necessarily always been 
as violent as Gandhi claimed, but had indeed chosen over thousands of 
years to use force of arms to remove a dynasty or ruler that had lost its 
“mandate of heaven.” This is the exact reason why Gandhi said that 
China had never attempted a non-violent solution to a governmental or 
imperial problem, and is also the reason why so many people agreed with 
Mao’s feelings that a violent revolution was necessary; because it had 
become so engrained in the consciousness of the Chinese people. 
Consequently, pursuing a course of action which included armed 
insurrection was in the best interests of Chinese Communist Party 
doctrine. 
To succeed in assimilating the support of the people, Mao 
pursued what Arif Dirlik has termed the “Sinification of Marxism,” or  
the “Marxification of Chineseness.” 90 The ideas of Marx, Engels, and 
Lenin were excellent templates for Mao, but his pragmatism made him 
realize that it was necessary to gain popular support by having a rural 
revolution, as mentioned earlier. This required modifying Marxism to the 
Chinese situation, even though the roots that called for a violent upheaval 
remained unaltered. Essentially, this became the nationalization of 
Marxism in order to give a Chinese identity to the revolution that people 
there could relate to. 
As Mao saw it, “the seizure of power by armed force, the 
settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of 
revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good 
universally, for China and for all other countries.”91 This exact concept 
was what should be the driving force and central task to any insurrection 
as he understood it, and the CCP followed it accordingly. While this may 
have fundamentally been more violent than what much of the peasantry 
were accustomed to, it does not negate the fact that Mao knew the idea 
was already there, he just had to encourage the growth of it. Mao 
believed that imperialists, colonizers, or any other type of occupiers in 
general would never relinquish their control or lay down their weapons 
without the people forcing them to do so with some form of violent 
attack.92 Even though the idea that China’s problems could only be 
solved through armed force was an integral CCP stance from the 
beginnings of the party, Mao was the one who applied it to the peasantry 
and not just the urban working class; this made him an important figure 
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Furthermore, this adds an additional link to why the topic of land 
reform was so important to Mao and the Communists, it was to placate 
the peasantry. Taking lands from lords and wealthy land-owners that had 
been using it to collect oppressive and impoverishing taxes from the rural 
classes (and then to redistribute it among them) would significantly 
improve their chances of gaining the trust of China’s masses. By 
reallocating the land, the peasants would have more of a say in their 
everyday lives and thus would be motivated to follow the CCP in 
revolutionary endeavors. Mao’s charisma continued to sell this policy, 
and it reaped him a great deal of power and prestige among the masses, 
something that no other party member could muster in a comparable 
quantity that would have challenged Mao during the revolution. 
The arguable culmination of pre-1949 Maoism was the 
Rectification Campaign in 1942. Principally, the point of the campaign 
was to root out corruption within the party that had surfaced while at 
Yan’an, and a great deal of this was done violently.93 Class struggle itself 
was advocated by many members of the CCP (Liu Shaoqi being a 
noteworthy example)94 and while it was meant to be a way to eliminate 
classes altogether and promote a forum in which all members of the party 
could express their opinions, it became a battleground for factional 
fighting and bitter political division. Mao aimed the Rectification 
Campaign at destroying the contradictions within the party caused from 
this and to forcefully reform the new wave of recruits received as a result 
of the Mass Exodus from the urban areas during the Japanese invasion to 
make sure they were more in line with party doctrine. To do this, he 
departed from the conservative and pragmatic land reform policies that 
the CCP had been utilizing before toward radical ones that were intended 
to force the peasantry to adapt to Mao’s thinking, instead of the other  
way around. There was vicious backlash from this shift to immediate 
change, as opposed to the moderate program the peasants had been 
accustomed to, and this caused Mao to realize that he had to re-adapt his 
ideals to better suit the people once again. After learning from his 
mistakes, Mao reasserted his pragmatism in the mid-1940s; had he not 
done so, he could have lost a great deal of support, and the movement 
may well have faltered. This event, nevertheless, marked the point where 
Mao began to move away from his pre-1949 realism. Afterwards, he 
indeed became the devoted advocate of class struggle in the People’s 
Republic of China period which people remember him for, and have 
chosen to incorrectly apply to his entire life. This exact illusion is the one 
in which this paper has been attempting to dispel. 
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This is why Mao continued to promote a theory that called for 
continuous revolution (as can be seen in the Cultural Revolution of 1966- 
1976)95 after this campaign, and this was an essential extension of the 
idea that rectification of the party was necessary, all in order to make  
sure that the revolution would continue advancing with the people and be 
on-going to deny individuals the possibility of becoming lax with 
Communist philosophy. Surprisingly, Gandhi also advocated “permanent 
revolution,” but it was only aimed at adapting to the everyday changes of 
Indian society to make sure that the revolution would not remain static,96 
rather than attempting to enforce some dogma over a prolonged period of 
time. Mao and Gandhi understood the necessity in this period to not only 
adjust their ideologies to better suit their environments and then to 
advocate for them, but both men also grasped that they had to continue 
the revolution in spirit after it was physically over, because the task of 
nation-building would then begin in the aftermath of the 




A Pragmatic Post-Mortem 
 
Mao became preoccupied with the constant need for violent upheaval, 
both during and after the revolution. He saw a future for his people that 
included a destruction of any last vestige of colonialism or oppression, as 
well as a lasting society that was devoid of the kinds of classes that could 
potentially promote capitalism and endorse a return to the Nationalist 
Party’s decadence. Mao believed in mass participation in politics and 
complete conformity to party doctrine and ideals. Additionally, he was a 
charismatic individual who was able to win over leadership of the party 
and guide the CCP, and the revolution, in a direction which would follow 
a modified Marxian framework that was spearheaded by a desire for 
violent, rapid, and immediate change to their present circumstances. 
Although he may have left his pre-1949 pragmatism by the wayside once 
he gained power, he undeniably made realistic contributions to their 
movement before the PRC was founded. 
Gandhi, likewise, was an anti-imperialist who longed for the day 
when the Indian people would no longer live under British rule and could 
manage their own affairs. He also believed in involving everyone in the 
society, including those from every caste and religious background. This 
was aimed at creating an atmosphere of internal cooperation first in order 
to be able to cooperate with England and convince them to leave their 
country. Unlike Mao, Gandhi and the Indian people were non-violent,  
and he adjusted his ideology to better suit that reality. Even though it is 
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difficult to discern if Gandhi would have also abandoned his pragmatic 
nature after independence, because of his assassination, it seems unlikely 
that would have been the case with his long record of non-violence and 
peaceful non-cooperation up to that date. 
Simply put, even though the nature and beliefs of the Indian and 
Chinese freedom organizations toward the type of revolution required 
were completely different, they were both led by men capable of working 
with the people at the peasant level and who amended their ideas and 
thoughts to better conform to the feelings of that class. Without the 
presence of these two figures, the Indian and Chinese revolutions would 
have had radically different ideologies, as no other person could have 
taken their place and fostered the same kind of revolutionary fervor and 
cooperation which Mao and Gandhi’s pragmatism were capable of 
creating. Even though there were others who led at various points during 
the revolutions, most were either unwilling or unable to adapt to what the 
general mood of the time required, and chose instead to pursue a 
philosophy that the majority could not rally behind. Furthermore, even 
though each group had other important leaders (because no one person 
can lead a movement on his/her own), such as the examples of  
Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai who were mentioned in the  
introduction to this paper, these other leaders were dwarfed by Gandhi 
and Mao and came to be men who worked behind-the-scenes instead of  
in the forefront. 
Whether Nehru or Zhou could have taken over and become the 
figures that Mao and Gandhi were in the event of their deaths or   
absences before independence is pure speculation. It does raise  
interesting questions, however, about whether the two men explored in 
this paper were absolutely vital to their revolutions, or just that the  
people had become psychologically dependent on them, because they   
had adapted to what the country needed when no other person had been 
able to in a comparable fashion. This may well be a topic which can be 
explored further and would shed additional light on these two figures, but 
it outside the purview of this examination. 
Mao Zedong and Mohandas Gandhi, nevertheless, personified 
their revolutions because the masses came to rely on them as their 
respective leaders as time passed and when no other person rose to 
challenge them with a comparable pragmatism or ideology which would 
have competed with the popularity of theirs. Although it is an easy 
exercise to say that they were the only people who could have led the 
Chinese and Indian revolutions, this argument cannot be substantiated. 
As this paper argued, however, they did come to characterize their 
movements and were the only ones able to adapt their beliefs, in the 
same way and at the same time, to the atmosphere present in their 
country’s revolutionary alliances. This resulted in Mao and Gandhi 
becoming integral figures in the minds of their people, hence the 
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mythical status which has been assigned to them, and explains why this 
paper tried to bring them down from that pedestal and see them for who 
they were, revolutionary pragmatists. 
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